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earl  ier drafts and  to Jeffery  W.  Gunther  for programming  assistance.Labor  Chojces  of Farm  Fami  lies:  Substitutes, Complements  and  Simultaneous
Deci  sion Maki  ng
The  growing  importance  of off-farm income  in the last 25  years  to the
welI being  of the agricultural  sector has sparked  some  research  attention
to the off-farm labor supply  of farmers.  Empirical  and  theoretical work  on
off-farm  labor supply, however,  seems  to  have  concentrated  for  the most
part on the farmer's labor supply  choices,  with only token  efforts made  to
jnclude the possible  simultaneous  effects of other family members'
decisions.  If  one  considers  the farm  family as a decision  unit,  then it  is
ljkely  that household,  on-farm,  and  off-farm labor supply  decisions  by
family members  are jointly  decided.
Uncovering  clues to Lhe  labor arrangements  of farm  households  may  have
important  implications for the debate  on the structune  of agriculture.
Some  anaiysts  claim that the U.S. is moving  to a structure with a greater
percentage  of smal.l  farms,  where  off-farm work  is the norm  (Tweeten).
Should  that be true, then those  farm  households  that exhibit the greatest
flexibility  in labor chojces  will  1ike1y  stand  the best chance  of survival.
If  farm fami'ly  iabor inputs to farm  production  are substjtutes, then
off-farm  work by one or more  family members  could be accommodated  with
greater ease.  Conversely,  if  the dominate  labor input relatjonships  were
complementary  in nature  then there would  be less chance  for a full-time
farming  family to make  a transition to a smal  ler  farming  enterprise
combined  with some  off-farm work.
This paper  makes  two  methodological  contrjbutions: one, farm  spouses
are explicitly  incorporated  into the labor supply  model  , and  two, labor
supply  decisions  are simultaneously  estimated  with a two-stage  probjtz
procedure. This paper  first  reviews  the labor supply  I iterature in
general  , and  the off-farm labor supply  I  iterature in particular.  A simple
static model  that incorporates  farmer  and  spouse  decision  making  is  then
developed. From  the theoretical model  , empirical off-farm participatjon
equations  are simultaneously  estimated  for  farmer  and  spouse. The
empirical estimates  show  that simultaneous  estimat'ion  makes  a large
difference in the effects of one  spouse's  off-farm labor decision  on the
other spouse. The  main  results are that farm  wives labor tends  to
substitute for (rather than complement)  male  farmers  on-farm  labor when  the
latter  engages  in off-farm work.
Labor  Supply Framewonk
Labor  supply  issues  have  been  extensively  studied in the economics
literature  with a large number  of both theoretjcal and  empirical research
accomplished  primarily in the last 25  years  or so (Keeley).  Male  labon
supply  (DeVanzo  et al)  and  female  labor supply  (Mroz)  have  been  treated in
depth, as have  family labor supply  (Blundell and  Walker,  Hausman  and  Ruud,
Ransom).
The  treatment  of married  females'  labor supply  is of special interest
because  analysis of farm famil  ies off-farm labor supply  is analogous. The
problem  posed  by farm famil  ies and  nonfarm  married  women  is  that many  do
not hold off-farm  or  away-from-the-  home  jobs.  That is,  for  some  farm
family members  and  some  married  women,  wages  and  hours  of outside
employment  are zero.  Heckman  (1974,  1979)  contributed  much  to static
one-period  analysis of  labor supply  with censored  samp'les.J
Despite  the extensive  research  of female  labor supply  response,  the
'I 
ikely  simultaneous  nature  of family labor supp'ly  decisjon  making  was
acknowledged  by its  absence. For  example,  in the baseline  model  jn Mroz's
r"ecent  critical  review  of female  labor supply  studies, "  ...  the husband's
behavjor  is  considered  exogenous"  (page  767).  Ransom,  however,  has
contributed  a model  with explicit  simultaneous  consideration  of husband  and
wife labor supply  responses  but his estjmates  for the compensated  cross
wage  elastjcities  for both the husband  and  wife were  not significant.
Explicit  treatment  of the likely  simultaneous  nature  of off-farm labor
supply  decisions  by farm families is the purpose  of this paper.
Farm  Labor  Supply
There  have  been  a signifjcant number  of studies that have  consjdered
the economics  of farmers  working  off  the farm  (Lee, Huffman,  Sumner,
S'impson  and  Kapitany,  Van  Kooten  and  Arthur).  The  techniques  pioneered  by
Heckman  were  soon  applied to farmersr  off-farm labor supply.  Sumner,  in a
paper  publ  ished  jn this  journal in 1982,  estimated
probability-of-participation,  wages,  and  hours  equations  for a group  of
Il linois farmers.  Van  Kooten  and  Arthur undertook  a somewhat  similar
analysis for Canad'ian  farmers.  Off-farm labor supply  model  s have  generally
been  limited to static  one-period  models. The  issue of the iabor supply  of
farm spouses  has  not been  addressed,  except  as a variable in a more  general
nonfarm  study  (for  example,  Schultz) or as part of studies looking
primarily at farmers  (Sumner  1978,  Lange).
One  of the advantages  of Heckmanrs  two-stage  method  is the explicit
treatment  of the participation decision.  In these  model  s, a probit first+
stage  is estinated  which  determines  the probability of particjpating in
off-farm employment.  The  participation equations  offer  one  opportunjty  to
jnvestjgate the interactive or simultaneous  nature  of off-farm labor supply
decisions.  In participation equations,  the binary dependent  variable
(whether  the farm  family member  works  off  the farm  or not) is a function of
the exogenous  variables in the model  .  Typically in one-period  static
modeis,  only a particjpation equation  for the farmer  is est.imated  although
variables representing  labor qua'l  ities  of the farmerrs  spouse  are usually
included.  An  alternative approach  would  be to choose  a model  such  that tvro
particjpation equations  would  be estimated: one  for the farmer, one  for
the farmer's spouse. In that v/ay,  the interactive nature  of farm  household
decisjon  making  could be tested.  Further, depending  upon  the signs and
signjficances  of the now-endogenous  participation decisions, some
inferences  could  be made  about  whether  farmer  and  spouse  labor are
substi  tutes, complements,  or independent.
This paper  outlines a modest  rearrangement  of a standard  one-period
statjc  labon  model  to include  the spousers  contribution and  then uses  a
two-stage  simultaneous  probit estimation  to measure  the effect of one
spouse's  labor off-farm labor supply  decision  on the other,
It4odelIing  Farm  Fami  ly Labor  Supply
The  farm  family is abstracted  to 'include  just  the farmer  and  the
spouse. There  is assumed  to exist a family utility  function whose
arguments  are family income  and  leisure time for both farmer  and  spouse.
There  is also assumed  to be a production  function that combines  farmer  and
spouse  1abor,  physical capital,  and  human  capital to produce  farm  outputf,
and  home  production.  The  problem  can  be built  up in a series of figures.
Considering  iust  the farmer, Figure  1 shows  a single input (farmer  labor)
production  functjon A-8, a wage  line w", and  an indifference curve  Uf.  In
a static  framework,  thjs  could adequateiy  explain the farmerrs  equi'l  ibrium
choice: the farmen  equates  the marginal  returns from farming  or home
production  to the off-farm wage  at C to the marginal  rate of substitution
between  income  and  leisure represented  by the slope  of the .indifference
fn
curve  U' at point D.  The  farmer  would  work  L", hours  on the farm, and
1n
L'f-L"f  hours  off  the farm.  The  distance  A-0 represents  nonlabor  jncome.
Similarly, the farm spouse  could  be considered  in isolation.  Assuming
that the spouse  works  on the farm  or for  home  production  then the spouse's
Iabor supply  could  be represented  by Figur"e  2.  Given  a similar production
function (A-E) with only spouse  labor as input, the spouse  would  equate  the
marginal  returns from farming  or home  production  with the off-farm wage
offer at point F, which  in equ.i  librium would  be tangent  to the spousers
indifference curve  Us  at G.  That  would  resu'lt in L0. hours  of work  on the
'tn
farm  and  L'--L",  hours  of work  off  farm.
>5
If  the farmer  and  spousers  labor supply  decisions  were  considered
jointly  determined,  then the process  and  the diagrams  become  more
compl  icated.  Figure  3, perhaps  overiy ambitious,  attempts  to jnclude  most
of the decisjons.  The  farmer  works  on the farm, and  just  considering  his
labor as input then the production  surface  reduces  to line A-8,  The  spouse
puts jn farm labor and  home  production  hours,  and  if  she  were  a1one,  the
production  function would  be  A-E.  The  surface  in between  the two Iines
shows  the increased  production  when  both work  on the farm  at the same  time.Both farmer and spouse  face off-farm  wage  offers,  although they can be
different  and  are in this djagram. The  two  wage  lines intersect and  are
tangent  to the production  surface  at point H.  The  tl,/o  intersecting wage
l'ines form  a wage  plane  IJKL.  The  family utility  surface  Uf's,  represented
by the bowl  shaped  feature, is  tangent  to the wage  plane  at point M.  The
,t7.'
farmer  would  work  L',  hours  on the farm  and  L"r-L',  hours  off  the farm.
Similarly,  the spouse  would  work  L2- hours  on the farm  and  L3- -  L2- hours sss
at an off-farm job.  In this  instance, both the fanmer  and  spouse  are in
equilibrium  when  their  off-farm wage  offer  equals  their marginal  return
from farming  equals  their marginal  rate of substitution between  income  and
leisure tine.  One  partnerrs choice  influences  the other, but the l-ates  are
not equa  li zed  across  the two i  ndi  vidual  s.
The  equiljbrium conditions shown  jn Figure  3 suggest  the derivation of
the farmer  and  spouse  off-farm labor panticipation decisions.  First there
is  the farming  production  function wh'ich  may  be  written:
(1)  Q=f(rf-.Lf  tl-.H  rt \r  f' 
L 
s'  "f "'s"\,,
where
Q  = farm output
f( ' 
) = producti  on functj on
L'f,  L's = labor input of farmer  (f)  and  farm  spouse  (s)
H*  H, = human  capital  input of farmer  and  spouse
6 = physi  cal capital
be:
The  marginal  return from  farming  for the farmer  and  his spouse  would7
(2)  rf  = P Qf(Lff  , tf'  tl'  ttr, x)
(3)  r,  = p Qr(Lfr, Lfr,  H'  Hr, r)
where  P  = price of farm  output
Qf('),  Qs(') = margjnal  product  from  farming  for the farmer  and  spouse
rf,  rs = marginal  return to farming  for farmer  and  spouse.
Simplified rvage  equations  for the farmer  and  the spouse  may  be:
(4)  wt = w(Fl,  Hr)
(5)  w, = w(!1,  Hr)
where  M  = labor market  characteristics
Fina1ly, the family utility  function may  be described  by
(6)  u = U(Lnil Lnr, y)
wnere
,n  ,n L"f,  L s 
= leisune  tjme of the farmer  and  spouse,
Y = famiiy i  ncome
and
.n L"f = tot"l  time -  L'f  -  L"'f
,n L"s = total  tjme -  Lr, -  L'',
,  of  ,  of L-'f,  L'' s 
= off-farm labor time of farmer  and  spouse
f  f  nf  ^f
Y = P Q(L'f,  L's, Hf, Hr, K) * wfL"',  + w.L"',  + Yn
Yn  = nonlabor  income  of the fam.i  1y
The  marginal  rate of substitution (MRS)  between  nonmarket  time and
fami  iy  i  ncome  is
(7) MRSf  = UrlU,
(8) MRS'  = Ur/U,
where  Ur, Ur, and  Uy  are partial  derivatives of the utility  function with
respect  to farmer  leisure, spouse  leisure, and  income.The  standard  equil  ibrium  conditjon holds  for each  individual with the
rates of return from  off-farm rvork  equaling  the farming  rate of return
which  js equal  to the marginal  rate of substitution between  nonmarket  time
and  family income. That  vras  shown  as point 1,4  in Figure  3 and.in the
fol  l  owi  ng two equations:
(9)  rf  = wf = MRSf
(10) r  =w  = MRS sss
There  are 13 unknowns  in the model:  two rates of return from  farming;
two off-farrn  wage  rates; two  margjnal  rates of substitution; six
time-allocation  variable.. rf  rf  rof  rof  'n  ',n s: L f,  L s, L  f,  L  s,  L f  ano  L s; ano  Tamr  ty
jncome. These  13 unknowns  are matched  with six definitional  equat.ions
(equations  2-5,7,8), the time constraints of the farmer  and  spouse,  the
definition  of family income,  and  four equii.ibrium  conditions  (equations  9
and  10).  h/hile  the model  is theoretjcally solvable, the main  interest for
this  paper  centers  on the equilibrium  conditions.  Note  that the model  does
not require the farmer's  equilibrium  conditions  to equal  those  of the
spouse. Thus  wages,  rates of return from  farm  work, and  the joint
evaluation  of leisure time expressed  through  the family utility  functjon
can  be different  for each  indivjdual.  Wh.i  le different,  that does  not mean
that decisions  are made  independently;  the family utility  functjon ensures
that 'individual  choices  conform  to mutual  oreferences.
Given  the time constraints, only four of the six time allocation
variables ane  independent.  The  four se.lected  here  are on- and  off-farm
'labor 
supply  decisjons  for farmer  and  spouse. Theoretically there is  no
need  for  either  the farmer or the spouse  to work on the farm --  off-farmJ
returns for both could  dominate  on-farm  returns at alI  leveis of work.
Such  a choice  is broader  than the scope  of this  paper  and  thus only farmers
that actually farm  will  be considered. That leaves  three famjly labor
participation choices:  on-farm  labor by the spouse  and  off-farm iabor by
both.  A1  1 spouses  are considered  to engage  in farm labor ejther directly
through  production  activities  or through  support  (home  production,
bookkeeping,  marketing,  etc).  hihat  is  left  js that both the farmer  and  the
spouse  are assumed  to be jn similar positjons: both work  on the farm  or in
the farm  household  with the option on engaging  'in off-farm work.
Gjven  that the separate  optimizations  are joined through  the utility
function, the participation chojces  are modeled  simultaneously. The
participation decjsions  are simultaneously  modeled  as functions  of the
relevant exogenous  variables and  the endogenous  partjcipatjon decisjon  of
the farmer  or spouse  as appropriate.
nf  ^f (11)  PL"'f = f(P, K, Hf, t4,  yn, pL"'s)
(-  -  ?  +  -  ?  )
n  f  ^f (I2)  PL"'s  = f(P, K, Hs, M, Yn, PL"'f)
(-  -  ?  +  -  ?  )
The  PL  variables are binary var  iables reflect'i  ng the decjsjon  whether
or not to take part in an activity.  The  signs under  the variables indicate
expectations  one  might  expect  from  economjc  theory,  Increased  prjce.s  for
agricultural output  would  have  a positive effect on on-farm  work  and  a
negative  effect on  work  off  the farm.  At the indiv.idual  level,  increases
in the amount  of agricultural capital that eniarges  the scale of the
farming  operation  is  likely  to leave  less time for off-farm work  by10
farmers.  That  would  mean  larger capital stocks  would  have  a negative
influence  on off-farm participation.  A competing  hypothesis  could  be that
some  additional capital  , keeping  the scale of the operation  fixed, would
free up labor time, so that increased  cap'ital  would  have  a positive effect
on off-farm decision  making. As the marginal  product  of farmers,  time
increases  with increased  capital and  to the degree  that spouses'  time is
substjtutable for farmers' time, the value  of home  production  and  farming
time should  increase  relative to outside  emp'loyment  for farm spouses  on
farms  and  ranches  characterized  by larger amounts  of capital.  Strong  labor
market  factors (M) could serve  to increase  off-farm job opportunities.
Nonlabor  income  is  likely  to depress  the incentive to work  more  hours,
either on or off  the farm.
The  signs and  significances  of the coefficients of other-spouse
participation decision  variables should  reveal  much  about  the djvision of
farm  household  labor.  The  predicted  values  of the participation decisjon
variable incorporate  the effects of market  wage  offers through  exogenous
variables that are usually included  in tvage  equations.  (For example,  Sumner
1982). This grounds  the participation decision  in traditional
subst'itutjon/complementary  re.lationships  that are hal  lmarks  of goods  in
utjlity  functions  and  inputs in production  functions.
Specifically, when  the off-farm wage  offer changes  to one  spouse  there
at least lhree sets of effects.  The  fjrst  is the own-price  effect,  that is
whether  the increase  in wage  increases  hours  worked  or whether  the income
effect reduces  hours  supplied  (the backward  bending 
'labor 
supply  curve
phenomenon).  Further, if  hours  of work  are changed,  how  are they divided11
between  farm work and off-farm  employment?  The second  effect  is  a
cross-price  effect on the amount  of leisure taken  by each  spouse. The
third,  which  is tied to the second,  is also a cross-price  effect:  how  will
the change  in one  spousers  wage  influence the other spouse's  labol supply?
If  the other spouse  changes  farm labor hours  in the same  direction as the
off-farm wage  offer to the first  spouse!  then husband  and  wife farm labor
inputs are gross  substjtutes for each  other.  If,  however,  the other spouse
changes  farm labor hours  in the opposite  direction,  then husband  and  wife
farm labor inputs are complements.
The  own-price  effect  is partially  captured  in the participation
estimation, to t,he  degree  that taking off-farm employmeht  in addition to
farming  or home  production  may  well entail more  job hours.  Mone  properly,
however,  such  determinations  would  be made  from  hours  equationst
estimations  (Mroz).  The  effects on leisure will  remain  unexamined  because
neither the model  proposed  nor the data set chosen  can  discriminate  between
home  production  and  leisure.  But the off-farm iabor participation
decisions, being  partial  functions  of the off-farm wage  offer,  can shed
light  on the substitute or complementary  nature  of husband-wife  labor used
in farming,/home  production.  If  the decision  varjables are .insignif  .icant  in
both equations  then the off-farm labor supply  decisions  of the farmer  and
the spouse  are completely  separable. That  would  confinm  the decjsions  of
some  previous  modelers  that the simultaneous  treatment  of participation
deci  sions  was  unnecessary.
Various  combinations  of signs and  significances  of participation
variables and  their  implications in spouse  off-farm labor decisions  are1.2
shown  jn Table 1.  If  the focus  on the farm  family is made  very tradjtiona'l
(considering  on'ly  married  male  farmers)  then some  expectations  can  be made.
For example,  suppose  the off-farm  wage  offer  to  the farmer exceeds  on-farm
returns at current farm  labor input.  Figure 1 indicates  that the farmer
would  reduce  farm labor hours, equilibrate the returns, and  work  off  the
farm.  If  the effect of the husbandrs  off-farm labor supply  decjsion is
positive and  significant on the wifers decision, it  most  like'ly means  that
the wife will  also reduce  home  production/farming  work  hours  in favor of
work  hours  off  the farm.  Such  results would  indicate a complementary
nature to  husband-wife  farm labor.
Estimating  Participation in 0n- and  0ff-farm Work
The  vaniables  to be included  in the equations  are suggested  by the
previous  section: output prices, physical and  human  capjtal,  labor market
characteristics, farm  production  attributes,  nonlabor  income,  and.
participation decjsions  regard'ing  other types  of work.  Given  that this  is
a cross-section  anaiysis, output prjces are assumed  the same  for all  and
thus are incorporated  into the constant  term.  Data  on farm  physical
capital  ls not readily available on the data set used  so capital is  proxied
by household  farm jncome. Farm  household  jncome  is  not an ideal proxy
because  of possible  complications  with endogeneity. Farmers  and  farm
spouses  acceptability as off-farm employees  is dependent  both on labor
market  conditions  and  job qualifjcatjons held by the jndividuals.  No
effective job market  conditions  proxies  were  found; thus that part of the
model  was  unspecified.  Personal  job qual  ifying characteristjcs such  as
experience  and  education  were  proxied  by age  and  schooling. Health  cant<
also play a significant role so a bjnary disability  variable was  .included.
The  level of nonlabor  jncome,  economjc  theony  suggests,  would  negatjvely
effect  labor supply  to all  endeavors, The  characteristics of the
production  technology  are only grossly proxied  by a bjnary variable
indicat.ing  whether  the farm is class.if  ied as a I ivestock  operation  or a
crop farm.  The  number  of childnen  5 and  under  has  been  included  because
studjes  of female  labor supply  have  shown  this to be a signifjcant  factor
in a woman's  decision  on  whether  to supply  labor other than for household
production.  Rounding  out the model  are the binary participation decision
vari  abl  es.
Data and Empi  ri cal Model  s
Seemingly  jmportant  for any study  of off-farm labor supply  is the
definitjon  of farmer  that is chosen. The  empirical results are iikely
conditjoned  by the definjtion  of who  is consjdered  a farmer.  Most  of the
recent studjes (Van  Kooten  and  Arthur, Simpson  and  Kapitany,  Sumner  1982)
djd not discuss  how  the farmer  was  defined in their  papers, One  reference
definition  could  be one  that js derived  from  the U.S. Department  of
Agriculturers (USDA)  definjtion  of a farm.  As is general  ly  known,  the USOA
has  a very inclusjve definition  of farms  from  which  springs  a relatively
large number  of operators.  The  USDA  defines a farm  as a place that
produces  or has  the potential to produce  $1,000  of annual  gross sales  of
agricultural products. A second  definitjon  of farmer  might  be one  that
selects those  who  consider  their  principal occupation  to be farm.ing  or
ranching.  The  above  two definitions of farmers  were  used  in th.i  s paper.
The  first  defjnition  attempts  to be consistent  with the USDA  definitjon  of14
farns by selecting those  individuals with at jeast g130  jn Census-defjned
farm sel  f-empl  oyment  i ncome. Farm  sel  f-empl  oyment  i ncome  correl ates
c'losely  with the new  'rnet  business  incomerr  for farmers  used  by the USDA
(Economic  Indicators, 1985).  The  Census  data are for the year 1979  and  in
the three years 1978-1980,  farmers' net business  income  was  about  about  13
percent, on average,  of their  gross  sa'les. Since  Census  data were  used,
the second  definition  selects those indiv'idual  s that listed  their
occupatjons  as farmers  (occupation  codes  473  and  474).
The  data are from  the Publ  ic-Use  l4icrodata  Sample  for Texas  and
California from  the 1980  Census  of Population  and  Housing. Texas  and
California were  chosen  because  of thejr  djverse agrjculture,  so that
results from  these  states might  be representative  of the nation.  The
desire to capture  the most  basic fami  ly interactions lead to restricting
the sample  to households  with male  householders  with spouse  present.  t,\lith
those  restrictions the number  of households  in the Texas  sample  totaled
3,053  using  the occupational  definition  of farmer.  With the USDA  or
income-based  definition  there  were  4,971  households.  For California, the
sample  included  1,448  households  under  the occupation  definjtion,  2,774
with the income  definition.  Table  2 shows  the all  the variables used  in
the model  along  with their means.
Two  sets of models  were  estimated.  First,  separate  participation
equations  were  estimated  for farmer  off-farm work  and  spouse  off-farm work.
In each,  the other spouse's  participation decisjon  was  included  as a binary
exogenous  variable.  In the second  model  , the two participation equatjons
were  estimated  simultaneously  using a two-stage  probit procedure  suggested
by Ma11ar".l5
Mallarrs technique  is analogous  to two-stage  least squares  jn linear
estimation.  Basically the first  stage  involves  regressing  each  of the
binary decisions  variables  on all  the exogenous  variables.  The  second
stage  involves  probit estimation  of the model  equations  using  the first
stage  predictions  of the probit index for each  of the endogenous  decjsion
va  ri abl  es.
Resul  ts
Tables  3-6 give the model  estimates  for Texas  and  California, with
separate  regressions  by farmer  definition.  Besides  the model  coefficienls.
t-statj stics,  and  derivatives, three measures  of goodness-of-fit  are
included:  -2.0 x likelihood ratio,  pseudo-R2,  and  the percent  correc  y
classified of those  that actually worked  off-farm (Judge  et a1).  Comparing
the ljkeljhood ratios and  the psuedo-R2  for across  spouses,  farmer
definjtions,  and  states shows  that (1) equations  for  farmers' spouses  have
better fits  that equations  for  farmers,  (2) the income  definjtjon  of farmer
provides  a markediy  better fit  that does  the occupational  definition,  ano
(3) Caljfornia data seem  to fit  the model  better than Texas  data.  The
results for the off-farm labor supply  decjsion  varjables show  that (1) when
deci  sjon variable coefficients are estimated  exogenous'ly,  the estimates
across  all  the models  are positive, significant,  and  very close to each
other in magnitude,  and  (2) when  decjsion  var.iable  coefficjents are
endogenously  determined,  signs, significancest and  magn.itudes  change  from
modei  to mode  l .
Homing  ln on the decisjon  variables, the exogenously  estimated  versions
indjcate complementarity  between  the farmer  and  the spouse  across  a1l10
model  s.  The  endogenously  estimated  dec'i  sion variable coefficients are nor
significant  in the Texas  occupational  definjtjon model  (Table  3).  Given
the nature  of the two-stage  estjmation  process,  the low explanatory  power
of the farmer  first-stage  (not reported)  may  have  precluded  a meaningful
second  stage  estimate.  Alternatively,  in Texas,  using the occupational
definition  of farmer,  the off-farm work  decisjons  of farmer  and  spouse  are
i  ndependent.
When  the income  definition  of farmer  is  used  (Table  4),  the Texas
results change  markedly. The  goodness  of fit  measures  increase
substan!ial1y, includ'ing  correctly classifying 86 percent  of farmers  that
actually worked  off  the farm.  The  spouse  goodness-of-fit  results also show
consjderab.le  improvement.  The  endogenously  determined  decision  variable
coefficients are now  significant.  The  most  noticeable  difference is the
lange  change  when  the farmer  participation vaniabie  in the spouse  equation
is  estimated  as a endogenous  variable as opposed  to an exogenous  one.  The
estimate  goes  from  being  positive and  significant to negative  and
significant.  The  endogenously  determined  spouse  participation variable in
the farmer  regression  is  similar in sign and  magnitude  to the exogenous
estimate.  Taken  as a pair the endogenously  estimated  farmer./spouse
particjpation coefficients fal.l into a category  that,  as shown  in Table  1,
seem  unlikely:  farmer  and  spouse  have  significant but oppose  effects on
the other.  Comparing  the magnitudes  of the derivatives, however,  offers
some  solace  --  the farmerrs  effect  is to reduce  the spousers  probability of
off-farm work  by 11 percentage  points, about  twice the size of the effect
of the spouse  on the farmer.  This probably  indicates a net substitution
relationship of off-farm labor supply.tl
Turning  to the remainder  of the Texas  results, the number  of children
five and  under  had  no effect on the farmer's off-farm labor decisions  but
was  uniformly  negative  and  sjgnificant for the spouse. That result is  a
measure  of divisjon of labor between  farmjng  and  home  production. Also, as
discovered  in unreported  regressions,  the effect of including the number  of
children tended  to knock  the signifjcance  out the age  variable in the
spouse  regression.  Farm  income,  whjch  was  used  as a measure  of the scale
of operation, proved  to be negative  and  significant as expected. The
larger the scale of the farming  operation,  the greater the Iikefihood that
ful  l-time attention was  needed.
For California farmers  and  their  spouses  the results (Tables  5 & 6)
were  general  ly different  from  those  estimated  for Texas. The
goodness-of-fit  measures  wene,  with one  exception,  larger in magnitude  than
the Texas  measures.  For both  definit'ions of farmer, the endogenously
detenmined  farmer  decision  variable coefficient  in the spouse  equation  was
negative  and  significant,  while the spouse  off-farm work  variable
coefficient in the farmer  equation  was  insignificant.  These  results would
indicate that farmer  and  spouse  labor tended  to be subst'itutes.  If  the
farmer"  worked  off  the farm, that would  influence  the spouse  to stay on the
farm, and  conversely. The  magnitude  of the influence  of the farmer,s
off-farm choice  on the spousers  off-farm work  decisjon  was  quite large.
For the occupatjonal  defjnjtion  of farmer  (Table  5), a farmer  electing to
work  off  the farm  would  lower  the spousers  probabiiity of working  off  the
farm  by 19 percentage  points.  For  the income  definition  of farmer  (Table
6), the farmer's choice  lowers  the spouse's  probab'i  lity  of off-farm work  by
9 percentage  poi  nts.18
Conclusion
0n balance,  the results would  seem  to indjcate the following: First,
that simultaneous  estimation  of off-farm participation equations  shows  that
there are real and  significant interactive effects in farm family decision
making. Second,  simultaneous  modeling  shows  farmer/spouse  labor to be
substjtutes rather than complements  as exogenous  estjmation  would  lead one
to be believe.  Third, general  ly the probabil  ity  of the farmerrs  spouse
working  off-farm declines  9 to 19  percentage  points, depending  on the
sample  selected, if  the farmer  chooses  to work  off  the farm.  Fourth,  this
effect however,  is not symmetrjcal: with one  exception,  the spouse's
off-farm work  decisjon  has  little  impact  on the farmerts  off-farm labor
supply  choice.  Fifth,  choice  of definition of farmer  and  chojce  of sample
of farmers  can  make  a difference in the estimated  results:  most
subpopulations  are probably  not representative  of a larger U.S. population
of farmers.  Even  using such  large and  diverse states as California and
Texas,  the estimated  results contain some  siqnifjcant djfferences.19
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-Table  1.  Implications  of 0ff-Farm  Labor  Choices
Signs  and  Significances  of Off-Farm
Labor  Supply  Coeffi  cients
Effect  of Effect  of  Farmer'  s Effect  of Spouse'  s
Labor  Deci  sions  Deci  sion on Spouse  Deci  sjon on Farmer
Sub  sti tute  s Negat  j  ve
Negat  j  ve
Negatjve
Insi  gni  fi ca  nt





Unlikely Insign  i  fi cant
Insigni  fi cant
Positive
Negati  ve
I  ncon  s  i  stent Pos  iti ve
Negat  i  ve
Neg  at  i  ve
Positive
Note  s  :
rrPositiverr  indicates a coefficient estimate  that is
posi  ti ve and  significant.
I'Negativerr  indicates a coefficient estimate  that js
negati  ve and  significant,
I'Insignificantrr  jndicates  a coeffjcient that is not
statistically  significant at the 5 percent  leve'lTable  2.  Means  of Model  Variables
Defi  n  iti on of Farmer
Texas Cal  i  fonni  a
Farmer
trlo  rk  Off- Farm
(  1=yes,  0=no)
Age  (Years)
Age  Squa  red
Schoo  1  i  ng
(  grades  compl  eted)
Hea  I  th
(l=disabled,0=not)
Spouse
Work  Off-  Farm
Age
Age  Sq  uared
Sc  hoo  l  i  ng
Hea  I  th
Fami  ly
Chi  ldren 5 And  Under
Non-Labor  I  ncome  (g)
Farmi  ng Income  (g)
Li  vestock Farm
(  1=Li  vestock,  0=not  )
Number















2863  .  01
11.87
0.  12











































277  4Table  3.  Probability  of Participation  in Off-Farm  Employment
in Texas  - OccuDational  Definition  of Farmer




I  ncome  1/
Years  of
S  choo  l  i  ng
Heal  th
Livestock  Farm
Children  5 And
lJnder
Farm  I ncome  1/
Estimati  on3/
-2.0 X Log
Li  kel  i  hood  Ratio  82.45
Pseudo-RZ 0  .03
0
Spouse  Choice  of Off-  Farm
Work  Exogenous  0,14  0,058  0.15  0.061
Estimationz/  (2.67)  (2.62)
Spouse  Choi  ce of 0ff-Farm
Work  (Simultaneous  -0.00075  -0.00030  -0.16  -0.064
-6.68  -0.16  -0.085  -0.24
(-4.e1)  (-1.i8)
0.031  -0.0020  0.013  -0.0043
(  2.60)  (0.  e4  )
0.00034  0.00039
(-2.e6) (-z.oo/
0.0017  0.00068  -0.081  -0.032
(0  .071  ) (-3.52)
0.029  0.011  0.088  0.021
(3.1e)  (8.ee)
0.056  0.022  -0.46  -0.18
(0.78) (-4.88)
0.094  0.037  -0.025  -0.010
(1.74)  (-0.43)
0.058  0.023  -0.42  -0.17
(  0.83  )  (-6.85  )
-0.13  -0.051  -0.098  -0.039
(-6.54)  -(2.64)
(  -0.0091) (-0.62)
44L.94
0.  11
28.79 Percent  Correctly
Cl  ass  i  fi ed
Average  Probabil  ity of
0ff-Farn Empl  oyment  0,21 0.  34
Empl  oyment
1 Income  data  used  were  in units of $10,000.
2 This is an  estimate  from  a separate  regression--included  here  for
compa  r  i  son  .
3 In the farmer  equations,  this is the predicted  value  of the probit index
for the spouse.  In the spouse  equations,  it  is the predicted  value  for
the farmer.
Note: Asymptotic  t-statjstics  in parenthesis.Table  4.  Probability  of Participation  in Off-Farm  Employment
in Texas  - Income  Definition  of Farmer





I  ncome  1/
Years  of
S  chool  i  ng
Heal  th
Livestock  Farm
Ch  i l  dren  5
and  Under
Farm  I  ncome  1/
-2.89  -0.018  -0.81  -0.23
(-10.70)  (-2.78)
0.13  -0.0040  0.038  -0.0035
f  1?  0?'l (3.06)
-0.0013  -0.00074
(-s.4r)  -.oooo49
0.11  0.044  -0.085  -0.034
(5.14) (-4.00)
0.083  0.020  0.10  0.019
(13.11) (11.66)
-0.26  -0.10  -0.40  -0.16
(-4.14) (-5.07)
-0.92  -0.36  -0.40  -0.16
(-17.00)  (4.81)
0.63  0.025  -0.44  -0.17
(1.15)  (-e.8e)
-0.37  -0.14  -0.22  -0.085
(  -?0  .07  ) (  -7.38  )
Spouse  Choice  of 0  ff- Fa  rm
Work  (Exogenous  0.20  0.080  0.16  0.062
Estimation2/  (4.60)  (3.43)
Spouse  Choi  ce of 0ff-Farm
lrlork  (sinultaneous  0.14  0.056  -0,27  -0.11
Estimation3/  (2.04)  (  -4.06  )
-2.0 X  Log
Likelihood  Ratio  1786,27
Pseudo-R2
Percent  Correct'ly
Cl  assifi  ed
Average  Probabi  I  i  ty of
Off-Farm  Employment  0.61
I Income  data  urere  used  jn units of $10,000.
2 This is an  estimate  from  a separate  regression--included  here  for
compari  son  .
3In  the farmer  equations,  this is the predicted  value  of the probit
index  for the spouse. In the spouse  equations,  it  is the predicted
va  lue for  the fanner.






0.44Table  5.  Probability  of Participation  in 0ff-Farm  Employment
in California  - Occupational  Definition  of Farmer




I  n  comel  /
Years  of
School  i  ng
Heal  th
Livestock  Farm
Ch  i  I  dren  5
and  Under
Farm  I  ncome  1/
Estimation3/
-2.0 X  Log
Li  kel  i  hood  Ratio  82.25
Pseudo-R2
Percent  Correctl  y
Cl  assified
Average  Probabil  ity
of 0ff-Farm  Employment  0.21
-1.41  -0.27  -1..24  -0.?3
(-2.83) (-2.06)




0.019  0.0075  -0.021  -0.0086
(0.52  )  (  -0.60)
0.054  0.017  0.095  0.020
(4.3e)  (4.74)
-0.21  -0.085  -0.28  -0.11
(-1.71)  (-1.e7)
0.17  0.070  -0.0013  -0.0051
(2.0s)  (-0.014)
-0  .032  -0  .013  -0  .  54  -0  .21
(-0.33)  (-6.85)
-0.13  -0.052  -0.18  -0.067
(-5.46)  (-4.3e)
Spouse  Choice  of Off-  Farm
Work  (Exogenous  0.24  0.094  0.23  0.092
Estimation2/  (2.93)  (2.69)
Spouse  Choice  of Off-Farm









1 Income  data  were  used  in units of $10,000.
2 This is an  estimate  from  a separate  regression--included  here
for comoari  son.
3In  the farmer  equations,  thjs is the predicted  value  of the probit
index  for the spouse.  In the spouse  equations,  it  is the
predicted  value  for  the farmer,
Note:  Asymptotic  t-statistics  in parenthesis.Table  6.  Probabil  ity of Participation  in 0ff-Farm  Employment
in California  - Income  Definition  0f Farmer
Variable  Farmer Derivative  Spouse  Derivative
Intercept  -2.00  -0.11  -0.72  -0.22
(-s.20)  (-1.e0)
Age  0.096  -0.0044  o.o4z  -0.0044
(  6.48)  (  2.5e)
Age  Squared  -0.0011  -0.00078
(-7.36)  (-4.34)
Non-Labor  0.039  0.015  -0.012  -0.0046
Incomel/  (1.48)  (-0.48)
Years  of  0.076  0.019  0.70  0.0i9
Schoolins  (9.56)  (7.03)
Health  -0.17  -0.070  -0.36  -0.f4
(1.8e)  (3.52)
Livestock  Farm  -0.85  -0.34  -0,40  -0,16
(-e.se)  (-3.34)
Ch'ildren  5  -0.056  -0.023  -0.4?  -0.17
and  Under  (-0.86)  (-7.58)
Farm  IncomeV  -0.?7  -0.10  -0.18  -0.070
(-13.e2)  (-6.00)
Spouse  Choice  of 0  ff- Fa  rm
Work  (Exogenous  0.26  0.10  0.24  0.093
Estinationz/  (4.56)  (4.03)
Spouse  Choice  of 0ff- Farm
Work  (Simultaneous  0.074  0.030  -0.23  -0,090
Estimation3/  (0.7s)  (-2.56)
-2.0 X  Log
Likel  ihood  Ratio  799.06  344.98
Pseudo-R2  o.zz  o,  09
Percent  Correctl  y
Cl  ass  ifi ed  87.80  48.46
Average  Probabi  I ity  of
Off-Fann  Empl  oyment  0.64  0.4?
I  Income  data  were  used  in units of $10,000.
2 This is an  estimate  from  a separate  regression--included  here
for  compari  son.
3In  the farmer  equations,  this is the predicted  value  of the probit
index  for the spouse.  In the spouse  equations,  it  is the
predicted  value  for  the farmer,
Note:  Asymptotic  t-statistics  in parenthesis.